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International
Shoe Co. v. Washington
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326
U.S. 310 (1945)
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What's
Going On?
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Appellant seeks
review of a judgment affirming the denial of its motion to dismiss
a notice of assessment of unpaid contributions to the unemployment
compensation fund of Appellee, the State of Washington.
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Who's
Who?
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Appellant :
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International Shoe
Co. – (original defendant) a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Missouri.
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Appellee :
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[State of]
Washington – (original plaintiff) state government.
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Facts:
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Statutes enacted by
Appellee, the State of Washington, establish an unemployment
compensation fund. The fund is supported by mandatory
contributions from each employer based on the annual wages payable
for its employees' services within the state. Appellant is a
Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes.
Its principal place of business is in Missouri. Appellant
maintains places of businesses in several states, but has no
office in Washington and makes no contracts for the sale or
purchase of merchandise, there. Appellant does not maintain goods
within Washington or make deliveries of goods in Washington in
intrastate commerce. During the three years in question, Appellant
employed and directly supervised eleven to thirteen salesmen who
resided in Washington, conducted their business in Washington, and
were compensated by commissions based on the amount of their sales
in Washington. The salesmen solicited orders from potential
customers, but did not have the authority to enter into contracts
or make collections. The salesmen occasionally rented rooms in
which their shoe samples were displayed to potential customers,
the cost of which was reimbursed by Appellant. The salesmen
transmitted their orders to Appellant, who would accept or reject
the orders from its office in Missouri. Defendant personally
served a notice of assessment for unpaid contributions upon one of
Appellant's salesmen within Washington, and mailed a copy of the
notice to Appellant's office in Missouri. Appellant made a special
appearance before the office of unemployment in
Washington, arguing that the notice of assessment should be set
aside because Appellant was not a corporation of the State of
Washington, and that its due process rights had been violated
because its activities within Washington were insufficient to
justify Appellee's personal jurisdiction over Appellant. The
courts below held that Appellee's jurisdiction over Appellant was
proper. Appellant appealed.
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Issue:
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May a state,
without violating the requirements of due process, exercise
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that is not incorporated
in that state, if the corporation has certain minimum contacts
with that state?
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Decision:
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Yes. A state may
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant that is not present
within a state without violating the requirements of due process
if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The demands
of due process are met when a corporation's contacts with the
forum state make it reasonable to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit brought in that forum. “Presence”
within a state generally exists when a corporation's activities in
the state are continuous and systematic. “Presence”
generally does not exist when the activities are casual, single,
or isolated; although in some exceptional instances, a single or
occasional act of a corporate agent within a state may be of a
nature sufficient to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction
of the state. Requiring a corporation to defend a suit in a forum
where its activities have not been substantial would be
unreasonably burdensome in a manner inconsistent with due process.
The test of whether due process is satisfied depends on the nature
and quality of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which due process protects. A
corporation enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of a
state in which it conducts its activities. The enjoyment of such
benefits and protections may justifiably impose an obligation upon
the corporation for which it may have to respond to suit within
that forum. In this case, Appellant has taken the privilege of
employing salesmen within the State of Washington, and Appellee is
attempting to collect a tax which its laws have laid upon that
privilege. Appellant's activities within Washington were
systematic and continuous throughout the years in question, and
the obligation for which Appellant is being sued upon arose out of
its activities within Washington. The activities therefore
establish Appellant's “presence” and justify
Appellee's personal jurisdiction over Appellant for the purpose of
recovering the tax. The maintenance of this suit therefore
conforms to the traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice, and does not violate Appellant's due process
rights.
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Basic
Rule:
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A state may have
personal jurisdiction over a defendant that is not present within
a state, without violating the requirements of due process, if the
defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
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Concurrence:
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The Court was
correct in determining that Appellee may subject Appellant to a
suit to recover Appellant's unpaid contributions; however, the
Court should not have based its decision on the notion of “fair
play” or substantial “justice.” The Federal
Constitution leaves each state the power to tax and to allow its
citizens to sue corporations whose agents conduct business within
the state. The rule announced in the Court's decision, however,
may result in those powers being struck down for not conforming to
the Court's idea of “fair play.”
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Terms:
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Special
Appearance :
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An appearance by
the defendant, before the court, to make a jurisdictional
objection. Unlike a general appearance, a special appearance is
not a consent to the court's jurisdiction over the defendant.
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Note:
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A corporation may
be the subject of personal jurisdiction because a corporation is a
legal person. This is often referred to as the “fiction of
the corporate personality.”
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