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Dee-K
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd.
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982
F.Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1997)
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What's
Going On?
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Motion by
Defendants (foreign corporations) to dismiss an antitrust action
brought against them by Plaintiffs (American corporations) for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
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Who's
Who?
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Plaintiffs :
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Dee-K
Enterprises, Inc. – Virginia corporation and purchaser
of rubber thread from Defendants; Asheboro [Elastics
Corporation] – North Carolina corporation and purchaser
of rubber thread from Defendants.
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Defendants :
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Heveafil Sdn.
Bhd., et al – Malaysian, Indonesian, and Thai
corporations engaged in the production of extruded rubber thread,
and American distributors.
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Facts:
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Plaintiffs,
Virginia and North Carolina corporations, purchased rubber thread
from Defendants to make products such as bungee cords. Plaintiffs
sued Defendants, Malaysian, Indonesian, and Thai corporations
engaged in the production of extruded rubber thread, alleging a
broad conspiracy among Defendants to fix prices and restrain
competition in rubber thread. Plaintiffs brought suit in the
Eastern District of Virginia. Defendants challenged jurisdiction
and venue.
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Issue:
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Does 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d) allow an alien defendant to be sued in any
district, despite the fact that the defendant was not “found”
there as required by § 12 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 22?
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Decision:
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Yes. To obtain
personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first point to a statute
or rule that authorizes service of process over the defendant.
Second, the service of process must comport with due process. In
this case, the first prerequisite is met by § 12 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (which provides
for worldwide service of process against corporate defendants in
antitrust actions) and by FRCP 4(k)(2) (under which a
defendant who is not subject to any state court's jurisdiction is
subject to personal jurisdiction in the federal courts if the
assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with federal law, and does
not offend the Constitution). The second prerequisite is met
because Defendants' appointment of exclusive U.S. Sales
representatives and the customization of its products for the U.S.
Market supply the minimum contacts required by due process. § 12
of the Clayton Act establishes venue
in any district where the defendant is found or where it transacts
business. Although it appears that the foreign defendants in this
case cannot be found in any U.S. Judicial district,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides that
aliens may be sued in any district, overrides any special venue
statute, including § 12 of the Clayton Act. Venue
is therefore proper for the foreign defendants. Plaintiffs have
not shown that venue
in the Eastern District of Virginia is proper for the American
defendants because the alleged Virginia-related contacts of the
American defendants are insufficient and the defendants have not
been found to be located in the Eastern District.
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Basic
Rule:
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28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d), which provides that aliens may be sued in any
district, overrides any special venue
statute, including § 12 of the Clayton Act.
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Terms:
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Venue :
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The possible or
proper location or locations for the trial of a suit.
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