Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391
v.
Terry

494 U.S. 558 (1990)

What's Going On?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an appellate court's determination that Respondents (union members) were entitled to a jury trial in an action against Petitioner (union) for breach of the duty of fair representation.

Who's Who?

Petitioner      :

Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 – (original defendant) union with whom Respondents' employer had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement.

Respondents :

Terry, et al – (original plaintiffs) 27 employees of a trucking company with whom Petitioner had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, members of Petitioner union.

Facts:

Respondents, 27 employees of McLean Trucking Company, were members of Petitioner Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391, a union. Petitioner and McLean were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that governed the terms and conditions of Respondents' employment with McLean. After McLean began alternatively laying off and recalling Respondents, Respondents filed grievances with Petitioner. Respondent prosecuted two of these grievances, but refused to prosecute a third, stating that the issue had been settled by the previous grievances. Respondents then sued Petitioner for compensatory damages in the form of back pay and benefits, alleging that it had violated the duty of fair representation. Respondents also sued McLean, but voluntarily dismissed the case after McLean filed for bankruptcy. [Respondents brought suit under the National Labor Relations Act, which does not expressly create the duty of fair representation, or state whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in an action for a breach of that duty. Petitioner therefore moved to strike a request made by Respondents for a jury trial. The district court denied Petitioner's motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Respondents were entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.]

Issue:

Does an employee who seeks compensatory damages for a union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation have a right to trial by jury?

Decision:

Yes. To determine whether Respondents are entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the Court first compares the statutory action to the 18th-century actions brought in the Courts of England, prior to the merger of the Courts of law and equity. Second, and most importantly, the Court examines the remedy sought and determines whether it is legal or equitable in nature. Because actions for breach of a union's duty of fair representation were unknown, and collective-bargaining was unlawful in 18th-century England, the Court must find an analogous cause of action to which the present action may be compared. Respondents argue that the present suit is comparable to an attorney malpractice action, which was historically legal in nature. Petitioner, however, more correctly contends that the present action is comparable to an action by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, which fell in the courts of equity. The attorney malpractice analogy is flawed because a client has much more control over his representation than does an individual member of a union, or the beneficiary of a trust. The trust analogy does not mean that Respondents' claim will be considered wholly equitable, because, in addition to proving that Petitioner violated its equitable breach of duty of fair representation, Respondents must prove that McLean violated the Labor Management Relations Act, which is comparable to a breach of contract claim – a legal issue. Because Respondents' action encompasses legal and equitable issues, the first part of the Seventh Amendment inquiry does not favor any particular determination. Although the award of monetary damages is not characterized as legal by default, the damages sought in this case shall be characterized as legal because Respondents' desired remedy has none of the attributes required to characterize it as equitable. Additionally, Petitioners do not seek any injunctive or restitutionary relief which could be considered equitable in nature. Because the remedy sought in this duty of fair representation action is legal in nature, Respondents are entitled to a jury trial on all issues. Affirmed.

Basic Rule:

An action for compensatory damages for an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation is legal in nature, unless it seeks injunctive or restitutionary relief.

Concurrence (Brennan):

The remedy sought by Respondents is legal in nature and they are therefore entitled to a jury trial by the Seventh Amendment; however the historical test used by the Court to determine whether a claim is a suit at common law under the Seventh Amendment should be simplified. The Court should no longer needlessly compare the substantive right at issue to English actions from 200 years ago, instead, the Court should focus on the nature of the remedy sought.

Concurrence (Stevens):

The Court has unnecessarily complicated the analysis by searching for a common-law analogue to the duty of fair representation. The duty of fair representation most closely resembles a common law action against an attorney for malpractice. The Court has overstated this action's similarity to an action against a trustee.

Dissent (Kennedy):

The Court correctly determined that the duty of fair representation action resembles an equitable trust action more than a suit for malpractice; however, the Court should have found this determination sufficient to conclude that the action was equitable and that there was no right to a jury trial.

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